Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: A comparative study

We study the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks, focusing on the influence of different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we consider three types of initial distributions for defectors: uniform distribution at random, occupying the most connected nodes, and occupying the lowest-degree nodes, respectively. It is shown that initial configurations for defectors can crucially influence the cooperation level and the evolution speed of cooperation. Interestingly, the situation where defectors initially occupy the lowest-degree vertices can exhibit the most robust cooperation, compared with two other distributions. That is, the cooperation level is least affected by the initial percentage of defectors. Moreover, in this situation, the whole system evolves fastest to the prevalent cooperation. Besides, we obtain the critical values of initial frequency of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions. Our results might be helpful in explaining the maintenance of high cooperation in scale-free networks.

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