Voting procedures under uncertainty

1. Choice Theory and Constitutional Design.- 1.1 Theories and Models.- 1.2 Applying Social Choice Theory.- 1.3 Varying Assumptions.- 2. Chaotic Behavior of Models.- 2.1 The U.S. Presidential Elections.- 2.2 Referendum Paradox and the Properties of Majority Rule.- 2.3 How Chaotic Can It Get?.- 3. Results Based on Standard Model.- 3.1 Voting Procedures.- 3.2 Performance Criteria.- 3.3 Chaos, Strategy and Self Correction.- 4. Aggregating Voting Probabilities and Judgments.- 4.1 Avoiding Arrow's Theorem via Average Rule.- 4.2 Condorcet's Jury Theorem.- 4.3 Relaxing the Independence Assumption.- 4.4 Optimal Jury Decision Making.- 4.5 Thought Experiment: Council of Ministers as a Jury.- 5. Condorcet's Rule and Preference Proximity.- 5.1 Condorcet's Rule.- 5.2 Measuring Preference Similarity.- 5.3 Preference Proximity and Other Desiderata.- 5.4 Ranking and Choice Rules.- 5.5 Kemeny, Dodgson and Slater.- 6. Responses to Changes in Voter Opinions.- 6.1 Monotonicity, Maskin-Monotonicity and No-Show Paradox 92.- 6.2 The Strong No-Show Paradox.- 6.3 Qualified Majorities and No-Show Paradox.- 6.4 Monotonicity Violations of Voting Systems.- 6.5 Preference Truncation Paradox.- 6.6 Preference Misrepresentation.- 7. Mos Docendi Geometricus.- 7.1 The British Parliamentary Elections of 2001.- 7.2 Critique of Condorcet's Intuition.- 7.3 Profile Decomposition.- 7.4 Berlin vs. Bonn Vote Revisited.- 8. Conclusions.- List of Figures 139 List of Tables.- Author Index.