论文信息 - The contemporary security dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan conflict

The contemporary security dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan conflict

Successful deterrence requires both threats and assurances about the conditionality of those threats. The real security dilemma is how to be tough enough without being overly provocative. Deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is possible, but not simple. Here's how.

Thomas J. Christensen | T. Christensen

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