The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief

The article proceeds upon the assumption that the beliefs and degrees of belief of rational agents satisfy a number of constraints, including: (1) consistency and deductive closure for belief sets, (2) conformity to the axioms of probability for degrees of belief, and (3) the Lockean Thesis concerning the relationship between belief and degree of belief. Assuming that the beliefs and degrees of belief of both individuals and collectives satisfy the preceding three constraints, I discuss what further constraints may be imposed on the aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief. Some possibility and impossibility results are presented. The possibility results suggest that the three proposed rationality constraints are compatible with reasonable aggregation procedures for belief and degree of belief.

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