论文信息 - Research Articles Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices*

Research Articles Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices*

the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in par ticular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans | Charles M. Kahn | R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans | C. Kahn

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