VITAMIN: Voltage inversion technique to ascertain malicious insertions in ICs

We propose an inverted voltage scheme for exciting and pronouncing the behavior of any undesirable logic that may be inserted in the IC manufactured abroad. The inverted voltage scheme is coupled with a sustained vector simulation technique to further enhance the behavioral difference between the genuine and targeted test IC. Experimental results on a variety of ISCAS'89 benchmarks show that we are able to significantly magnify the difference between the genuine and tampered designs. For most of the smaller benchmarks, our inverted voltage method is able to detect the effect of the tamper directly at the primary outputs of the IC, especially when existing techniques fail to make any observable distinction. For the larger circuits, our technique is able to magnify the power consumption of the tampered circuit by several times.

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