CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations

In France the chairperson of the board is mostoften the firm's CEO. This position strengthensthe insiders' hold on the board of directors.Moreover, a large fraction of outside directorsis composed of CEOs of other firms. Thereciprocal interlocking of CEOs creates the possibility of mutual interdependence of CEOs.We investigate factors explaining reciprocalinterlocking directorates of CEOs in Frenchcorporations. Our results indicate that CEOs oflarger firms hold more reciprocal CEOinterlocks and when CEOs have more outsidedirectorships, CEOs hold more reciprocalrelationships. We also find a positiverelationship between the number of CEOsreciprocal interlocks and their firms'performance measured by ROA. We find evidencethat CEOs hold more reciprocal interlocks whena blockholder is present on the CEO's board.

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