Nato burden sharing: 1960–1992

This paper presents an up‐to‐date study of defense burden sharing in NATO for 1960–1992, using a variety of burden‐sharing measures. By analyzing the relationship between GDP and the proportion of GDP allocated to defense, we demonstrate that the exploitation of the large allies by the small ended around 1967 and never returned. A comparison of defense burdens and defense benefits received is supportive of the joint product model as explaining NATO burden‐sharing behavior during the last 25 years. Despite recent profound changes, including the end to the Cold War, the Reagan build‐up of forces, and the modernization of strategic forces, the joint product model remains applicable. Policy conclusions are drawn.

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