Continuing Friction between the Army and the Air Force: Different Perspectives.

Abstract : This monograph discusses the difference between both ground and air commanders who are subordinate to an overall theater commander. Although joint doctrine has evolved and improved, there are still differences between the two kinds of commanders due to the different theater views they hold. The ground commander is generally concerned with his locality and area of interest, while the air commander is concerned with a theater-wide prosecution of the conflict. These two views tend to be at odds with each other, and conflict between the two kinds of commanders tends to develop. To examine this phenomena, the monograph uses two case studies that occurred nearly fifty years apart. The first case study is the North African campaign that occurred in 1942 and 1943. The second case study is the Gulf War that occurred in 1990 and 1991. Using both primary and secondary sources, the monograph examines the doctrine that was available prior to the respective conflicts, how the theater command architecture evolved in each case, and how the differences between the two commanders developed during the respective conflicts. After examining these two case studies individually, the monograph compares the two conflicts. First of all, the doctrine was not much help in either case. It was developed in peacetime by consensus, and therefore allowed each service to 'see' the potential use of military force the way it wanted to. It didn't stand up to the rigors of combat and solutions had to be hastily implemented. Secondly, in both cases, the implementation of a strong, unambiguous theater command architecture helped the situation. It did not, however, satisfy the more local requirements of the ground commanders.