Decidable Reasoning in a Fragment of the Epistemic Situation Calculus

The situation calculus is a popular formalism for reasoning about actions and change. Since the language is first-order, reasoning in the situation calculus is undecidable in general. An important question then is how to weaken reasoning in a principled way to guarantee decidability. Existing approaches either drastically limit the representation of the action theory or neglect important aspects such as sensing. In this paper we propose a model of limited belief for the epistemic situation calculus, which allows very expressive knowledge bases and handles both physical and sensing actions. The model builds on an existing approach to limited belief in the static case. We show that the resulting form of limited reasoning is sound with respect to the original epistemic situation calculus and eventually complete for a large class of formulas. Moreover, reasoning is decidable.

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