How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

[1]  Gábor Lugosi,et al.  Learning correlated equilibria in games with compact sets of strategies , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[2]  Fabrizio Germano,et al.  Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[3]  Dean Phillips Foster,et al.  Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent , 2006 .

[4]  Gábor Lugosi,et al.  Prediction, learning, and games , 2006 .

[5]  Andreu Mas-Colell,et al.  Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[6]  Yishay Mansour,et al.  From External to Internal Regret , 2005, J. Mach. Learn. Res..

[7]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games , 2005, STOC '05.

[8]  Gábor Lugosi,et al.  Internal Regret in On-Line Portfolio Selection , 2005, Machine Learning.

[9]  S. Hart.  Adaptive Heuristics , 2005 .

[10]  Amotz Cahn,et al.  General procedures leading to correlated equilibria , 2004, Int. J. Game Theory.

[11]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games , 2004, ICML.

[12]  Sham M. Kakade,et al.  Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium , 2004, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[13]  Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi,et al.  Potential-Based Algorithms in On-Line Prediction and Game Theory , 2003, Machine Learning.

[14]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Strategic Learning and Its Limits , 2004 .

[15]  S. Hart,et al.  Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium , 2003 .

[16]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..

[17]  Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi,et al.  Potential-Based Algorithms in Online Prediction and Game Theory , 2001, COLT/EuroCOLT.

[18]  Andreu Mas-Colell,et al.  A General Class of Adaptive Strategies , 1999, J. Econ. Theory.

[19]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[20]  S. Hart,et al.  A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium , 2000 .

[21]  Eyal Kushilevitz,et al.  Communication Complexity , 1997, Adv. Comput..

[22]  Dean P. Foster,et al.  Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium , 1997 .

[23]  L. Shapley,et al.  REGULAR ARTICLEPotential Games , 1996 .

[24]  E. Kalai,et al.  Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .

[25]  J. Jordan.  Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria , 1993 .

[26]  J. Jordan,et al.  Bayesian learning in normal form games , 1991 .

[27]  Sergiu Hart,et al.  Existence of Correlated Equilibria , 1989, Math. Oper. Res..

[28]  L. Hurwicz.  Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes , 1977 .

[29]  R. Aumann.  Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies , 1974 .

[30]  John G. Kemeny,et al.  Mathematical models in the social sciences , 1964 .

[31]  W. Hoeffding.  Probability inequalities for sum of bounded random variables , 1963 .