论文信息 - Softening competition through forward trading

Softening competition through forward trading

Abstract In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel's long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic literature.

P. Mahenc | F. Salanié | Philippe Mahenc | François Salanié

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