Do local governments do it better? Analysis of time performance in the execution of public works

This paper aims at analysing the time performance of infrastructure procurement based on the characteristics of the contracting authorities involved. We focus on the execution stage, which is crucial for the efficient provision of public works and their planned benefits. An empirical analysis, based on data drawn from a large sample of Italian public works, is developed. The main result is that the local governments seem to be less efficient in the management of the execution process, as they suffer from longer delays than the central government. This phenomenon was more severe for small municipalities and when the contract was mainly financed with external resources. The result is relevant for understanding whether decentralization matters in the execution of public works and for discussing the policy implications in terms of the organisation of the public works sector.

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