Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: An alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
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Peter M. Kort | Richard F. Hartl | Jonathan P. Caulkins | Gustav Feichtinger | Andrea Seidl | Dieter Grass | Andreas J. Novak | R. Hartl | J. Caulkins | D. Grass | G. Feichtinger | P. Kort | A. Novak | A. Seidl
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