Analysing Security Protocols using CSP

In this chapter we describe how security protocols can be analysed using the process algebra CSP and the model checker FDR. The basic technique is to build a CSP model of a small system running the protocol, together with the most general intruder who can interact with that protocol, and then to use the model checker FDR to explore the state space, looking for insecure behaviours. We will base our explanation of the technique upon the book’s running example:

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