Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates from a Bargaining Model

This article uses a novel approach to measure the unobserved liquidation value of a firm that relies on the information contained in the allocations that are agreed upon in Chapter 11 negotiations. I estimate a game theoretic model that captures the influence of liquidation value on the equilibrium allocations using a newly collected data set. I find that the liquidation values are higher when the industry conditions are more favorable, and the real interest rates are higher. I use the estimated model to conduct a counterfactual experiment to quantitatively assess the impact of a mandatory liquidation on the equilibrium allocations.

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