RPKI is Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of RPKI Deployment and Invalid Route Origins
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Bruce M. Maggs | Nick Sullivan | John P. Rula | Taejoong Chung | Alan Mislove | Dave Levin | Roland van Rijswijk-Deij | Emile Aben | David R. Choffnes | Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran | Tim Bruijnzeels | B. Maggs | Dave Levin | E. Aben | A. Mislove | Taejoong Chung | R. V. Rijswijk-Deij | B. Chandrasekaran | N. Sullivan | Tim Bruijnzeels
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