An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

Abstract As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path.

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