A compiler for analyzing cryptographic protocols using noninterference

The Security Process Algebra (SPA) is a CCS-like specification languag e where actions belong to two different levels of confidentiality. It has been used to define several noninterference-like security properties whose verification has been automated by the tool CoSeC. In recent years, a method for analyzing security protocols using SPA and CoSeC has been developed. Even if it has been useful in analyzing small security protocols, this method has shown to be error-prone, as it requires the protocol description and its environment to be written by hand. This problem has been solved by defining a protocol specification language more abstract than SPA, called VSP, and a compiler CVS that automatically generates the SPA specification for a given protocol described in VSP. The VSP/CVS technology is very powerful, and its usefulness is shown with some case studies: the Woo-Lam one-way authentication protocol, for which a new attack to authentication is found, and the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol, where different kinds of attack are detected and analyzed.

[1]  Dawn Xiaodong Song.  Athena: a new efficient automatic checker for security protocol analysis , 1999, Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[2]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  CVS at Work: A Report on New Failures upon Some Cryptographic Protocols , 2001, MMM-ACNS.

[3]  Dominique Bolignano.  An approach to the formal verification of cryptographic protocols , 1996, CCS '96.

[4]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  The Compositional Security Checker: A Tool for the Verification of Information Flow Security Properties , 1997, IEEE Trans. Software Eng..

[5]  C. A. R. Hoare,et al.  Communicating sequential processes , 1978, CACM.

[6]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Some new attacks upon security protocols , 1996, Proceedings 9th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[7]  Paul Syverson,et al.  A Taxonomy of Replay Attacks , 1994 .

[8]  Natsume Matsuzaki,et al.  Key Distribution Protocol for Digital Mobile Communication Systems , 1989, CRYPTO.

[9]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR , 1996, Softw. Concepts Tools.

[10]  Simon S. Lam,et al.  A semantic model for authentication protocols , 1993, Proceedings 1993 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[11]  G Denker,et al.  Capsl Intermediate Language , 1999 .

[12]  Catherine A. Meadows,et al.  The NRL Protocol Analyzer: An Overview , 1996, J. Log. Program..

[13]  John C. Mitchell,et al.  Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/ , 1997, Proceedings. 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.97CB36097).

[14]  R.,et al.  A CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY PROPERTIES FOR PROCESS ALGEBRAS 1 , 1994 .

[15]  Lawrence C. Paulson,et al.  The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols , 2021, J. Comput. Secur..

[16]  Robin Milner,et al.  Communication and concurrency , 1989, PHI Series in computer science.

[17]  Somesh Jha,et al.  A model checker for authentication protocols , 1997 .

[18]  Paul C. van Oorschot,et al.  Authentication and authenticated key exchanges , 1992, Des. Codes Cryptogr..

[19]  Roger M. Needham,et al.  Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers , 1978, CACM.

[20]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols , 1998, Proceedings. 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (Cat. No.98TB100238).

[21]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols , 1997, Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[22]  Robert M. Keller,et al.  Formal verification of parallel programs , 1976, CACM.

[23]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  A Taxonomy of Security Properties for Process Algebras , 1995, J. Comput. Secur..

[24]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The spi Calculus , 1999, Inf. Comput..

[25]  Fabio Martinelli,et al.  A Uniform Approach for the Definition of Security Properties , 1999, World Congress on Formal Methods.

[26]  David L. Dill,et al.  The Murphi Verification System , 1996, CAV.

[27]  Michael Goldsmith.  The perfect spy for model−checking crypto−protocols , 1997 .

[28]  Martín Abadi.  Two facets of authentication , 1998, Proceedings. 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (Cat. No.98TB100238).

[29]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  CVS: a compiler for the analysis of cryptographic protocols , 1999, Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[30]  Gavin Lowe.  Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols , 1998 .

[31]  Riccardo Focardi.  Analysis and Automatic Detection of Information Flows in Systems and Networks , 1999 .

[32]  Joshua D. Guttman,et al.  Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct? , 1998, Proceedings. 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.98CB36186).

[33]  G. Lowe,et al.  Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using CSP and FDR , 1996 .

[34]  John A. Clark,et al.  A survey of authentication protocol literature: Version 1.0 , 1997 .

[35]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols , 1994, Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[36]  John Ulrich,et al.  Automated Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols Using Mur ' , 1997 .

[37]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  Non Interference for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols , 2000, ICALP.

[38]  Simon S. Lam,et al.  A lesson on authentication protocol design , 1994, OPSR.

[39]  Owen Rees,et al.  Efficient and timely mutual authentication , 1987, OPSR.

[40]  A. W. Roscoe,et al.  Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol , 1997, IEEE Trans. Software Eng..

[41]  Roberto Gorrieri,et al.  CVS a tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. , 1999 .

[42]  Thomas Y. C. Woo,et al.  Authentication for distributed systems , 1997, Computer.

[43]  Corrado Priami,et al.  Authentication via localized names , 1999, Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[44]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A logic of authentication , 1989, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences.

[45]  Steven M. Bellovin,et al.  Encrypted key exchange: password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks , 1992, Proceedings 1992 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy.

[46]  Danny Dolev,et al.  On the security of public key protocols , 1981, 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1981).

[47]  Mahadev Satyanarayanan,et al.  Integrating security in a large distributed system , 1989, TOCS.

[48]  Jonathan K. Millen,et al.  CAPSL: Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language , 1996, NSPW '96.

[49]  Catherine A. Meadows,et al.  Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange protocol using the NRL Protocol Analyzer , 1999, Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.99CB36344).

[50]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus , 1997, CCS '97.

[51]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols , 1994, IEEE Trans. Software Eng..

[52]  DuranteAntonio,et al.  A compiler for analyzing cryptographic protocols using noninterference , 2000 .