论文信息 - A Study of two Biases in Probabilistic Judgments: Representativeness and Equiprobability

A Study of two Biases in Probabilistic Judgments: Representativeness and Equiprobability

Abstract From an experimental study of two biases in probabilistic judgments — the representativeness bias in situations of inductive inference, and the equiprobability bias in "purely random" situations — it is shown that it is possible to characterize two types of cognitive aids which differ by their impact point: the object to which the probabilistic judgment pertains (for the representativeness bias), or the activated representation (for the equiprobability bias).

[1] A. Tversky,et al. BELIEF IN THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS , 1971, Pediatrics.

[2] L. Ross,et al. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. , 1981 .

[3] E. Fischbein,et al. Intuitions primaires et intuitions secondaires dans l'initiation aux probabilités , 1971 .

[4] Ward Edwards,et al. Dynamic Decision Theory and Probabilistic Information Processings1 , 1962 .

[5] L. J. Chapman,et al. Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs. , 1969, Journal of abnormal psychology.

[6] Bruno Lecoutre,et al. Nonprobabilistic Statistical Inference: A Set-Theoretic Approach , 1986 .

[7] M.-P. Lecoutre,et al. Jugements probabilistes et modeles cognitifs: Etude d'une situation aleatoire , 1988 .

[8] W. Edwards,et al. Conservatism in a simple probability inference task. , 1966, Journal of experimental psychology.

[9] C. Peterson,et al. A primacy effect in subjective probability revision. , 1967, Journal of experimental psychology.