Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

[1]  B. Arms,et al.  Cooperation , 1926, Becoming Rooted.

[2]  A. L. Kroeber,et al.  The Nature of Culture , 1952 .

[3]  G. C. Homans,et al.  Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. , 1975 .

[4]  P. Blau.  Exchange and Power in Social Life , 1964 .

[5]  W. Hamilton.  The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. , 1964, Journal of theoretical biology.

[6]  Michael T. Ghiselin,et al.  The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex , 1964 .

[7]  J. Goodall,et al.  Tool-Using and Aimed Throwing in a Community of Free-Living Chimpanzees , 1964, Nature.

[8]  J. Jay Braun,et al.  Evolution and Human Behavior , 1967, The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine.

[9]  W. Hamilton,et al.  Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model , 1970, Nature.

[10]  R. Trivers.  The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[11]  George Williams.  Group Selection , 1971 .

[12]  Group selection, altruism, reinforcement, and throwing in human evolution. , 1975, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[13]  E. Wilson.  Sociobiology: The New Synthesis , 1976 .

[14]  Robert M. May,et al.  Group selection , 1975, Nature.

[15]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[16]  J. M. Smith,et al.  Group Selection , 1976, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[17]  Michael Taylor,et al.  Anarchy and cooperation , 1976 .

[18]  G. Holton.  Sociobiology: the new synthesis? , 1977, Newsletter on science, technology & human values.

[19]  R. Lewontin.  ‘The Selfish Gene’ , 1977, Nature.

[20]  Robert Boyd,et al.  Density-dependent mortality and the evolution of social interactions , 1982, Animal Behaviour.

[21]  C. Boehm,et al.  The evolutionary development of morality as an effect of dominance behavior and conflict interference , 1982 .

[22]  George A. Akerlof.  Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange , 1982 .

[23]  M. Feldman,et al.  Gene-culture coevolution: models for the evolution of altruism with cultural transmission. , 1985, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[24]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[25]  T. Yamagishi.  The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good , 1986 .

[26]  John Orbell,et al.  Organizing Groups for Collective Action , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[27]  D. Barash.  The Biology of Moral Systems, Richard D. Alexander. Aldine, Hawthorne, New York (1987), xx, +301. Price $34.95 hardback, $16.95 paperback , 1987 .

[28]  Barbara Isaac,et al.  Throwing and human evolution , 1987 .

[29]  Kaori Sato.  Distribution of the cost of maintaining common resources , 1987 .

[30]  F. Fifer.  The adoption of bipedalism by the hominids: A new hypothesis , 1987 .

[31]  P. Richerson,et al.  The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. , 1988, Journal of theoretical biology.

[32]  Toshio Yamagishi,et al.  Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System , 1988 .

[33]  Toshio Yamagishi,et al.  The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan , 1988 .

[34]  W. Güth,et al.  Ultimatum bargaining behavior : a survey and comparison of experimental results , 1990 .

[35]  Alan R. Rogers,et al.  Group Selection by Selective Emigration: The Effects of Migration and Kin Structure , 1990, The American Naturalist.

[36]  M Acheson James.  The lobster gangs of Maine. , 1990 .

[37]  H. Jane Brockmann,et al.  The selfish gene (2nd edn) , 1990 .

[38]  S. Zamir,et al.  Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study , 1991 .

[39]  Robin I. M. Dunbar,et al.  Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans [and Comments and Replies] , 1991, Current Anthropology.

[40]  ScienceDirect.  Journal of social and biological structures , 1991 .

[41]  L. Cosmides,et al.  The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture , 1992 .

[42]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible , 1992, American Political Science Review.

[43]  L. Cosmides,et al.  The psychological foundations of culture. , 1992 .

[44]  E. Fehr,et al.  Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation , 1993 .

[45]  G. Brady.  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action , 1993 .

[46]  J. Ledyard.  Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .

[47]  S. Blount.  When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences , 1995 .

[48]  R. Thaler,et al.  Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners , 1995 .

[49]  J. Kagel,et al.  Handbook of Experimental Economics , 1997 .

[50]  J. Andreoni.  Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? , 1995 .

[51]  E. Fehr,et al.  Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets , 1995 .

[52]  E. Fehr,et al.  Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence , 1997 .

[53]  E. Fehr.  A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation , 1998 .

[54]  E. Fehr,et al.  Collective action as a social exchange , 1999 .

[55]  P. Bingham,et al.  Human Uniqueness: A General Theory , 1999, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[56]  E. Fehr,et al.  Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[57]  T. Bewley.  Why Wages Don't Fall during a Recession , 1999 .

[58]  C. Keser,et al.  Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods , 2000 .

[59]  H. Gintis.  Strong reciprocity and human sociality. , 2000, Journal of theoretical biology.

[60]  V. Smith.  Bargaining and Market Behavior , 2000 .

[61]  R. Evans,et al.  Cooperation and Punishment , 2001 .

[62]  I. Mysterud.  Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior , 1999 .

[63]  Samuel Bowles,et al.  Individual Interactions, Group Conflicts, and the Evolution of Preferences , 2000 .

[64]  R Boyd,et al.  Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. , 2001, Journal of theoretical biology.

[65]  Francis L. W. Ratnieks,et al.  Spite: Hamilton's unproven theory , 2001 .

[66]  S. Gächter,et al.  Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[67]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies , 2001 .

[68]  R. Boyd,et al.  In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small- Scale Societies , 2001 .

[69]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions , 2001 .

[70]  E. Fehr,et al.  Altruistic punishment in humans , 2002, Nature.

[71]  Herbert Gintis,et al.  Behavioural science: Homo reciprocans , 2002, Nature.

[72]  John Tooby,et al.  Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. , 2002 .

[73]  Three essays on the evolution of cooperation , 2003 .

[74]  Herbert Gintis,et al.  The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms. , 2003, Journal of theoretical biology.

[75]  M. Feldman,et al.  The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions , 2022 .