Applications of transport economics and imperfect competition

The great majority of analyses made in transport economics use, explicitly or, more often, implicitly, the common assumption of perfect competition. This is the case, for instance, when infrastructure projects are evaluated using the mere sum of the surpluses of transport users and providers. Even when putting aside the question of externalities such as noise, safety or environmental quality, the real chain of economic interactions that takes place in transport provision or downstream of transport provision is not taken into account. Surely enough, describing and simulating this chain could be quite complex. Nevertheless, it is not uninteresting to try to estimate if it does make a big difference or not to make this approximation. The paper makes such an attempt for two broad kinds of applications of transport economics:

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