Identifying Preferences under Risk from Discrete Choices

When studying consumption choices, economists have often relied on the abstraction of a representative agent. Such an agent can indeed be shown to exist and to replicate the aggregate consumers' demand under standard, but not necessarily convincing assumptions (Kirman (1992)). There was also ajustifiable reluctance to introducing heterogeneous preferences, as such a step may seem ad hoc when trying to explain different consumption behaviors. The rise of empirical studies based on micro data has opened new perspectives. The micro-economic importance of uninsurable risks is now recognized, and threatens the foundations of the representative agent hypothesis often used in macroeconomics. The continuing controversies surrounding the question of individual attitudes towards risk has motivated many empirical studies and observations; most of them conclude to a bewildering diversity of individual preferences. This paper proposes to check the conditions under which heterogeneous individual attitudes toward risk can be non-parametrically identified from discrete data on choices under risk. Our main result establishes that given data that is usually available (essentially market shares of the different options, plus the realizations of the final outcomes of agents), the analyst can recover the whole distribution of individual preferences if this can be indexed by a one-dimensional parameter, provided that a fairly weak single-crossing condition holds. We then discuss several applications of our general methodology.

[1]  Charles A. Holt,et al.  Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice , 2007 .

[2]  Pierre-André Chiappori,et al.  Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets , 2000, Journal of Political Economy.

[3]  Shachar Kariv,et al.  Individual Preferences for Giving , 2005 .

[4]  W. Kip Viscusi,et al.  How Unobservable Productivity Biases the Value of a Statistical Life , 2005 .

[5]  Marc Henry,et al.  Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the Spatial Voting Model , 2010 .

[6]  Introduction to Robustness , 2007 .

[7]  Amit Gandhi Rational Expectations at the Racetrack : Testing Expected Utility Using Prediction Market Prices , 2006 .

[8]  Syngjoo Choi,et al.  Consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty , 2007 .

[9]  Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background Risk , 2008 .

[10]  Roberto Finzi,et al.  Mirrlees James A , 2006 .

[11]  Bruno Jullien,et al.  Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case , 2006 .

[12]  Pierre-André Chiappori,et al.  Relative Risk Aversion Is Constant: Evidence from Panel Data , 2011 .

[13]  Bruno Jullien,et al.  Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications , 2006 .

[14]  Miles S. Kimball,et al.  Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Survey , 1995 .

[15]  B. Jullien,et al.  Estimating Preferences under Risk: The Case of Racetrack Bettors , 2000, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  You are what you bet : eliciting risk attitudes from horse races Still preliminary , 2008 .

[17]  Daniel Paravisini,et al.  Risk Aversion and Wealth: Evidence from Person-to-Person Lending Portfolios , 2010 .

[18]  Joseph E. Aldy,et al.  The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World , 2003 .

[19]  P. Johansson On the value of changes in life expectancy. , 1996, Journal of health economics.

[20]  Daniel T. Winkler,et al.  Contracts, Labor Supply and Income Targeting , 2011 .

[21]  A. Kirman Whom Or What Does the Representative Individual Represent , 1992 .

[22]  J. Mirrlees An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation an Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation L Y 2 , 2022 .