Flood & Loot: A Systemic Attack on The Lightning Network

The Lightning Network promises to alleviate Bitcoin's known scalability problems. The operation of such second layer approaches relies on the ability of participants to turn to the blockchain to claim funds at any time, which is assumed to happen rarely. One of the risks that was identified early on is that of a wide systemic attack on the protocol, in which an attacker triggers the closure of many Lightning channels at once. The resulting high volume of transactions in the blockchain will not allow for the proper settlement of all debts, and attackers may get away with stealing some funds. This paper explores the details of such an attack and evaluates its cost and overall impact on Bitcoin and the Lightning Network. Specifically, we show that an attacker is able to simultaneously cause victim nodes to overload the Bitcoin blockchain with requests and to steal funds that were locked in channels. We go on to examine the interaction of Lightning nodes with the fee estimation mechanism and show that the attacker can continuously lower the fee of transactions that will later be used by the victim in its attempts to recover funds - eventually reaching a state in which only low fractions of the block are available for lightning transactions. Our attack is made easier even further as the Lightning protocol allows the attacker to increase the fee offered by his own transactions. We show that the vast majority of nodes agree to channel opening requests from unknown sources and are therefore susceptible to this attack. We highlight differences between various implementations of the Lightning Network protocol and review the susceptibility of each one to the attack. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to lower the systemic attack risk of the network.

[1]  Rabiah Abdul Kadir,et al.  Improvements of the Balance Discovery Attack on Lightning Network Payment Channels , 2020, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[2]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Congestion Attacks in Payment Channel Networks , 2020, Financial Cryptography.

[3]  S. Ruj,et al.  Griefing-Penalty: Countermeasure for Griefing Attack in Lightning Network , 2020, 2005.09327.

[4]  Ferenc Beres,et al.  A Cryptoeconomic Traffic Analysis of Bitcoins Lightning Network , 2019, ArXiv.

[5]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Secure High-Rate Transaction Processing in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.

[6]  Aviv Zohar Securing and scaling cryptocurrencies , 2017, IJCAI.

[7]  László Gulyás,et al.  Topological Analysis of Bitcoin's Lightning Network , 2019, MARBLE.

[8]  Pedro Moreno-Sanchez,et al.  SoK: Layer-Two Blockchain Protocols , 2020, Financial Cryptography.

[9]  Sreeram Kannan,et al.  Deconstructing the Blockchain to Approach Physical Limits , 2018, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[10]  Christian Decker,et al.  A Fast and Scalable Payment Network with Bitcoin Duplex Micropayment Channels , 2015, SSS.

[11]  Feng Hao,et al.  Towards Bitcoin Payment Networks , 2016, ACISP.

[12]  Giulio Malavolta,et al.  Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability , 2019, NDSS.

[13]  Christof Weinhardt,et al.  Towards an economic analysis of routing in payment channel networks , 2017, SERIAL@Middleware.

[14]  Christian Decker,et al.  Information propagation in the Bitcoin network , 2013, IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings.

[15]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  Teechan: Payment Channels Using Trusted Execution Environments , 2016, ArXiv.

[16]  Joaquín García,et al.  LockDown: Balance Availability Attack against Lightning Network Channels , 2020, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[17]  Christian Decker,et al.  Lightning network: a second path towards centralisation of the Bitcoin economy , 2020, New Journal of Physics.

[18]  Matthew Green,et al.  Bolt: Anonymous Payment Channels for Decentralized Currencies , 2017, CCS.

[19]  Sushmita Ruj,et al.  Griefing-Penalty: Countermeasure for Griefing Attack in Bitcoin-compatible PCNs , 2020, ArXiv.

[20]  Stefan Schmid,et al.  Hijacking Routes in Payment Channel Networks: A Predictability Tradeoff , 2019, ArXiv.

[21]  Florian Tschorsch,et al.  Discharged Payment Channels: Quantifying the Lightning Network's Resilience to Topology-Based Attacks , 2019, 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW).

[22]  Alex Biryukov,et al.  Probing Channel Balances in the Lightning Network , 2020, ArXiv.

[23]  Elaine Shi,et al.  On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains - (A Position Paper) , 2016, Financial Cryptography Workshops.

[24]  Joaquín García,et al.  On the Difficulty of Hiding the Balance of Lightning Network Channels , 2019, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[25]  Ethan Heilman,et al.  TumbleBit: An Untrusted Bitcoin-Compatible Anonymous Payment Hub , 2017, NDSS.

[26]  Pavel Prihodko,et al.  Flare : An Approach to Routing in Lightning Network White Paper , 2016 .