[특집] 남북한간의 군사적 투명성 제고방안: 정보생산의 관점을 중심으로

Assuming that military confidence building and arms control will become an important agenda item in the beginning of the 21 century, this paper aims at presenting the measures to increase transparency about each other's military intentions, behaviors, policies and postures that can contribute to reducing tension and building peace between North and South Korea. The military transparency measures found out in this research are hoped to pave a constructive way for pursuing inter-Korean reconciliation and establishing a new peace system. 1. Military Transparency and Information Production This paper assumes that it is more practical for pursuing operational and structural arms control to be preceded by increasing military transparency. Namely, achieving more transparency on military intentions, behaviors, policies and postures can lead to reducing military tension and further to creating an opportunity for better relations between the two Koreas. Military transparency is the degree of knowledge nations in rivalry relations have regarding the other side's military intentions, behaviors, policies and postures. Information production is an essence of increasing military transparency. information production activities can be classified into as follows. First, unilateral monitoring (UM) is a unilateral information collection activity performed by an information collector against the other side (an information collector). Second, cooperative monitoring (CM) is an information collection activity carried out by an information collector under the collaboration of an information collector. Third, unilateral demonstration (UD) is a unilateral information revelation activity performed by an information collector regarding itself in a way to reduce uncertainties held by an information collector. Fourth, cooperative demonstration ( CD ) is an information revelation activity carried out by an information collector regarding itself with due considerations of an information collector's concerns and interests. 2. A Case Study of the Sinai Peninsula The peace building process between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula is an excellent example to increase military transparency and improve political relations by adopting a variety of transparency measures. The two countries signed the Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement in January 1974 and the Sinai Interim Agreement in September 1975 to gradually expand buffer zone and enhance military transparency. Based on the trust built, a peace accord was finally signed in March 1979. During this process, a third party's role was very important. First of all, UN Emergency Force Ⅱ (UNEF Ⅱ) had supervised the implementation of the two agreements. Second, the U.S. established the Sinai Field Mission (SFM) and performed ground and aerial observations independently. Third, with the peace accord signed, Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) was substituted to play the observation role. 3. Key Considerations for Developing Military Transparency Measures in Korea There are five key considerations for developing effective military transparency measures between North and South Korea. First, principles of comprehensiveness, detour and gradualism should be respected during negotiations as well as implementations. Second, an asymmetry of information collection activities between North and South Korea should be recognized. South Korea has advantages in terms of technical capabilities while North Korea is superior in human intelligence. Third, it is important to acknowledge and accept constructive role of a third party (a specific country or an international organization). Fourth, human elements and technical assets have to be combined in a harmonious way. Fifth. to avoid unnecessary clashes between the two sides' military, civilians can be utilized in the implementing process. 4. Stepwise Measures to Increase Military Transparency in Korea The arms control process between North and South Korea is assumed to consist of five stages. At the first stage where transparency enhancement begins, the military measures to be applied by the two sides voluntarily and the non-military measures to be taken through bilateral cooperation can be implemented. The second stage is to strengthen military transparency by carrying out militarily meaningful measures. Agreement on arms control or arms reduction is not necessary at the two stages. At the third stage, an operational arms control agreement such as withdrawing part of military forces from the DMZ to the rear is signed and implemented. The fourth stage is the arms reduction stage where key offensive weapons are cut to agreed levels. At the fifth stage, peaceful coexistence is established and maintained through the previous efforts of the four stages. This paper has proposed a package of military transparency measures according to the five stages of arms control based on the principles of comprehensiveness, detour and gradualism. At a new stage, the previous measures continue to be used and based on that, stronger ones are adopted. And very new measures are developed and introduced as well. Through such a stepwise process, four information production activities can performed in a mutually reinforcing way and the efficiency and effectiveness be maximized.