Gegen die Mythen der Hochschulreformdiskussion - Wie Selektionsorientierung, Nonprofit-Verfassungen und klassische Professorenbeschäftigungsverhältnisse im amerikanischen Hochschulwesen zusammenpassen
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] P. Nelson. Information and Consumer Behavior , 1970, Journal of Political Economy.
[2] P. R. Coelho. Rules, Authorities, and the Design of Not-for-Profit Firms , 1976 .
[3] E. Lazear. Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[4] H. Hansmann,et al. The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise , 1980 .
[5] Edward P. Lazear,et al. Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions , 1981 .
[6] E. Fama,et al. Separation of Ownership and Control , 1983, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[7] E. Fama,et al. Agency Problems and Residual Claims , 1983 .
[8] Roger E. Meiners,et al. University Governance: A Property Rights Perspective , 1988, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[9] H. Carmichael. Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure? , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.
[10] H. Hansmann,et al. Why Do Universities Have Endowments? , 1990, The Journal of Legal Studies.
[11] L. Zacharias,et al. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law , 1993 .
[12] M. Rothschild,et al. The University in the Marketplace: Some Insights and Some Puzzles , 1991 .
[13] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Economics, Organization and Management , 1992 .
[14] M. C. Jensen,et al. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems , 1993, A Theory of the Firm.
[15] Susan Rose-Ackerman,et al. Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory , 1996 .
[16] W. O. Brown. University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation , 1997 .
[17] A. Picot,et al. Organisation: eine ökonomische Perspektive , 1998 .
[18] Gordon C. Winston. Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education , 1999 .
[19] A. Kieser. Über Marktmechanismen nachdenken: Aspekte zum Wettbewerb an Universitäten , 1999 .
[20] M. Schapiro,et al. Tenure Issues in Higher Education , 1999 .