Ignition of Algorithm Mind: The Role of Energy in Neuronal Assemblies

The ignition of the algorithmic mind is a fascinating phenomenon that occurs in our brains. The algorithm mind is related to our reasoning. When we use it, we consume a lot of resources from our brains like energy. The ignition process is triggered by reflective mind and it works through neuronal assemblies. Specific neurons are ignited and then it begins a recruitment process for other neurons in order to assemble a complex structure. To understand these mechanisms, we have developed a simple multi-agent model, where we explored the role of energy and respective limits on neuronal assemblies. The available and consumed energy are the keystones to ignite the algorithm mind and to find out the limit that interrupts our reasoning’s. The connections between incumbent and new neurons are at the same level as the connections established only between the new neurons in the case of algorithmic mind. Unlike, the autonomous mind established more connections, only between new neurons. Finally, the algorithmic mind consumes more energy than autonomous mind, which has a clearly declining trend.

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