As we approach the thirtieth anniversary of the Challenger Disaster (January 28, 2016), how do we continue to educate current and future leaders on how to make decisions that involve significant risk and uncertainty with the lessons of Challenger in mind? To address this challenge we have created a case that places decision makers in a situation of risky choice. The case uses but masks the facts of the Challenger launch decision in the premise of a Coast Guard response to a wrecked cruise ship that is leaking oil. The protagonist in the case, Captain Bob Ross, a Coast Guard pilot, has to decide whether or not to send immediately the one Hercules aircraft he has available to move the oil-pollution equipment. Captain Ross faces pressure to send the flight and uncertainty regarding recent engine problems that may or may not be temperature related. We collected decision responses from participants for multiple versions of the case to see how different pieces of additional information can influence decisions. We demonstrate that both additional information regarding the worst case consequences and additional information regarding the relationship between temperature and seal failure will make decision makers less likely to send the flight. While these conditions are less likely than the base-case description, less likely is still high as around 70% (depending on condition) send the flight even with additional information. For the base-case description, 83.5% sent the flight. We conclude with discussion of the insights for organizational learning that can be gained from a case discussion of a decision similar to that faced by the Challenger managers but in a context different than Challenger.
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