Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting

Approval voting (AV) has been defended and criticized from many different viewpoints. In this paper, I will concentrate on two topics: preference intensities and strategic behavior. A voter is usually defined as voting sincerely under AV if he or she gives a vote to all candidates standing higher in his or her ranking than the lowest-ranking candidate for whom he or she gives a vote. There are no ‘holes’ in a voter’s approval set.1 Since this kind of behavior is extremely rare, it has been claimed that approval voting makes strategic voting unnecessary (Brams and Fishburn 1978). On the other hand, Niemi (1984) has argued (see also van Newenhizen and Saari 1988a,b), that even though strategic voting may be rare under AV, even incere voting may require a considerable amount of strategic thinking under this rule. If strategic voting is defined by the fact that a voter gives his or her vote to a candidate who is lower in his or her ranking than some candidate for whom he or she does not vote (see, e.g., Brams and Sanver 2006), I will be studying strategic behavior but not strategic voting under AV here.

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