Attention as a minimal criterion of intentionality in robots

It is proposed that the capacity of attention is a minimal criterion of intentionality in robots. An attentive system must be able to identify relevant objects in the scene; select one of the identified objects; direct its sensors towards the selected object; and maintain its focus on the selected object. We describe the robot R1 which exhibits behavior that seems intentional. However, when the robot is confronted with a situation where more than one object is present on the scene, the fact that the behavior of R1 is determined merely by S-R rules becomes apparent. We also defend the position that a robot with attention would have a minimal level of intentionality, since the attentional capacity involves a first level of goal representations. This criterion is also useful when discussing intentionality in animal behavior.

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