Scheduling, Isolation, and Cache Allocation: A Side-Channel Defense

Despite the isolation mechanisms that are available to cloud service providers, like virtual machines and containers, the problem of side-channel vulnerabilities due to shared caches and multicore processors remains a threat. We present a hardware-software mechanism that improves the isolation of cloud processes in the presence of shared caches on multicore chips. Our technique can enable cache-side-channel free computing for Linux-based containers and virtual machines by com-bining the Intel CAT architecture that enables cache partitioning with novel scheduling techniques and state cleansing mechanisms. We evaluate our system using a CPU-bound workload and demonstrate cache-side-channel-free computation that is correct by construction. Our system allows Simultaneous Multithreading to remain enabled and does not require application level changes.

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