Checklists and Monitoring in the Cockpit: Why Crucial Defenses Sometimes Fail

Checklists and monitoring are two essential defenses against equipment failures and pilot errors. Problems with checklist use and pilots failures to monitor adequately have a long history in aviation accidents. This study was conducted to explore why checklists and monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. Flight crew procedures were observed from the cockpit jumpseat during normal airline operations in order to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of checklists and monitoring. Cognitive explanations for deviations from prescribed procedures are provided, along with suggestions for countermeasures for vulnerability to error.

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