Non-profiled Mask Recovery: the impact of Independent Component Analysis

As one of the most prevalent SCA countermeasures, masking schemes are designed to defeat a broad range of side channel attacks. An attack vector that is suitable for low-order masking schemes is to try and directly determine the mask(s) (for each trace) by utilising the fact that often an attacker has access to several leakage points of the respectively used mask(s). Good examples for implementations of low-order masking schemes include the table re-computation schemes as well as the masking scheme in DPAContest V4.2. We propose a novel approach based on Independent Component Analysis (ICA) to efficiently utilise the information from several leakage points to reconstruct the respective masks (for each trace) and show it is a competitive attack vector in practice.

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