Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets

We study envy-free (EF) mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenue-maximizing EF auctions is NP-hard, even for the case of identical items and additive valuations (up to the budget). The main result of our paper is a novel EF auction that runs in polynomial time and provides a approximation of 1/2 with respect to the revenue-maximizing EF auction. A slight variant of our mechanism will produce an allocation and pricing that is more restrictive (so called item pricing) and gives a 1/2 approximation to the optimal revenue within this more restrictive class.

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