论文信息 - Sustainability in bankruptcy problems

Sustainability in bankruptcy problems

This paper focuses on a new property for bankruptcy rules, calledsustainability, which requires that the agents with small enough claims be fully reimbursed. We show that the constrained equal-awards rule is the only rule that satisfies path independence and sustainability. Exploiting duality relations, we also provide a characterization of the constrained equal-losses rule, as the only one that satisfies composition and independence of residual claims (the dual property of sustainability).

Carmen Herrero | A. Villar

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