Three Programs and Ten Criteria: Evaluating and Improving Acquisition Program Management and Oversight Processes Within the Department of Defense

Abstract : During the past 15 to 20 years, many acquisition programs have encountered technical shortfalls, schedule slippage, and cost growth. Most such problems occurred in the development phase of the acquisition process. The significant investment in these programs and the potential for cost growth in these programs are concerns to all management levels within the Department of Defense, the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branch. Over the past four decades, blue ribbon panels, special study groups, and other management reviews have developed strategies aimed at improving the acquisition process. Such reviews originate when the administration changes and a new Secretary of Defense takes office. For example, in spring 1989, the Defense Management Review (DMR) was chartered by the Secretary of Defense. It resulted in the establishment of a shorter, more direct chain of command between the Program Manager and the Service Acquisition Executive. For each of the Services, this new chain of command represented a major change in program-management reporting. As is to be expected, it took time for this new process to be understood completely and to become fully institutionalized. Problems and successes in major defense acquisition programs, when accurately identified, can be a source of guidance for improving acquisition management procedures. This report describes and qualitatively evaluates acquisition management procedures in three aircraft development programs: the Navy's F/A-18E/F aircraft, the Air Force's F-22 fighter aircraft, and the Army's RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter.