Proactive Defense Against Physical Denial of Service Attacks Using Poisson Signaling Games

While the Internet of things (IoT) promises to improve areas such as energy efficiency, health care, and transportation, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. In particular, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks overload the bandwidth of a server. But many IoT devices form part of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Therefore, they can be used to launch "physical" denial-of-service attacks (PDoS) in which IoT devices overflow the "physical bandwidth" of a CPS. In this paper, we quantify the population-based risk to a group of IoT devices targeted by malware for a PDoS attack. In order to model the recruitment of bots, we develop a "Poisson signaling game," a signaling game with an unknown number of receivers, which have varying abilities to detect deception. Then we use a version of this game to analyze two mechanisms (legal and economic) to deter botnet recruitment. Equilibrium results indicate that 1) defenders can bound botnet activity, and 2) legislating a minimum level of security has only a limited effect, while incentivizing active defense can decrease botnet activity arbitrarily. This work provides a quantitative foundation for proactive PDoS defense.