Are default contributions sticky? An experimental analysis of defaults in public goods provision

Previous research provides compelling evidence that defaults affect individual behaviour in several domains. However, evidence of their influence in strategic interaction is scant. We experimentally investigate the effect of defaults on contributions to a public good and attempt to shed light on potential channels through which they operate. Our main experimental findings show that defaults influence contribution behaviour: preference for a suggested contribution significantly increases when it is presented as the default. However, this effect seems not to operate primarily through information conveyance or expectations about others’ behaviour. Default contributions, thus, appear to have an attractive power that goes beyond recommendation signals and expectation influences.

[1]  Rachel T. A. Croson.  Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games , 2007 .

[2]  Eric J. Johnson,et al.  The Construction of Preference: Do Defaults Save Lives? , 2006 .

[3]  Andreas Roider,et al.  Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases , 2009, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[4]  J. Ledyard.  Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .

[5]  William Samuelson,et al.  Status quo bias in decision making , 1988 .

[6]  O. Johansson-Stenman,et al.  Funding a New Bridge in Rural Vietnam: A field experiment on conditional cooperation and default contributions , 2011 .

[7]  S. Gächter,et al.  Who Makes a Good Leader? Cooperativeness, Optimism, and Leading‐By‐Example , 2012 .

[8]  J. Baron,et al.  Status-quo and omission biases , 1992 .

[9]  Barry Sopher,et al.  Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study , 2003, Journal of Political Economy.

[10]  Barry Sopher,et al.  Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[11]  A. Falk,et al.  Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[12]  C. Whan Park,et al.  Choosing What I Want versus Rejecting What I Do Not Want: An Application of Decision Framing to Product Option Choice Decisions , 2000 .

[13]  Gerald L. Lohse,et al.  Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out1 , 2002 .

[14]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1979, American Journal of Sociology.

[15]  W. Güth,et al.  Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments , 2007 .

[16]  Monika Bütler,et al.  The choice between an annuity and a lump sum: Results from Swiss pension funds ☆ , 2007 .

[17]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron , 2003 .

[18]  Eldar Shafir,et al.  Reason-based choice , 1993, Cognition.

[19]  M. Lepper,et al.  When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much of a good thing? , 2000 .

[20]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[21]  Jason Dana,et al.  The default pull: An experimental demonstration of subtle default effects on preferences , 2012, Judgment and Decision Making.

[22]  Devan V Mehrotra,et al.  A Cautionary Note on Exact Unconditional Inference for a Difference between Two Independent Binomial Proportions , 2003, Biometrics.

[23]  T. Sterner,et al.  Are experienced people affected by a pre-set default option—Results from a field experiment , 2009 .

[24]  Barry Sopher,et al.  Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice , 2006 .

[25]  R. Thaler.  Toward a positive theory of consumer choice , 1980 .

[26]  A. Tversky,et al.  Choice under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision , 1992 .

[27]  Stacey R. Finkelstein,et al.  Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults , 2006, Psychological science.

[28]  Gur Huberman,et al.  How Much Choice is Too Much?: Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans , 2003 .

[29]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[30]  Stephen M Fleming,et al.  Overcoming status quo bias in the human brain , 2010, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[31]  Daniel Houser,et al.  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Leadership, Cheap Talk and Really Cheap Talk , 2022 .

[32]  Garett Jones,et al.  Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoner's dilemma experiments, 1959–2003 , 2008 .

[33]  R. Dhar,et al.  The Effect of Time Pressure on Consumer Choice Deferral , 1999 .

[34]  Ulrike Malmendier,et al.  Paying Not to Go to the Gym , 2006 .

[35]  Eric J. Johnson,et al.  Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions , 1993 .

[36]  Aldo Rustichini,et al.  Cognitive skills affect economic preferences, strategic behavior, and job attachment , 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[37]  O. Mitchell,et al.  How Behavioral Finance Can Inform Retirement Plan Design , 2006 .

[38]  Rachel Croson,et al.  The effect of recommended contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods , 2001 .

[39]  Roberto A. Weber,et al.  How effective is advice from interested parties?: An experimental test using a pure coordination game , 2007 .

[40]  Ananish Chaudhuri,et al.  Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice , 2004 .

[41]  M. V. Levati,et al.  Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information , 2007 .

[42]  Magnus Johannesson,et al.  Higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p-beauty contest , 2009 .

[43]  Wolfgang J. Luhan,et al.  Cedex Discussion Paper Series , 2022 .

[44]  Daniel Pichert,et al.  Green defaults : Information presentation and pro-environmental behaviour , 2008 .