Games networks play a game theoretic approach to networks

Traditional network protocols such as TCP/IP require cooperation between traffic sources to achieve optimal network performance. This approach does not always work, as evident by frequent congestion problems in the Internet. Recent research in protocol design using game theory removes this limitation by modeling traffic sources as competing players and results in efficient and fair distribution of resources. This paper provides theoretical background of the game theoretic approach as applied to networks, describes some previously proposed schemes for minimizing network congestion, elaborates on pricing mechanisms and discusses game-theoretic routing solutions. Pricing provides a feasible solution for congestion control but application of distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) can be adapted for congestion control.

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