论文信息 - Contract design and bargaining power

Contract design and bargaining power

Abstract It is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. In contrast, this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties. Endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions.

Roman Inderst | R. Inderst

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