论文信息 - A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information

A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information

Multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer. Most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player. This paper re-examines the bargaining model in Rubinstein (1985a, b). Monotonicity restrictions are placed on off-the equilibrium-path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures. Sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized.

Sushil Bikhchandani | S. Bikhchandani

[1] P. Cramton. Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty , 1992 .

[2] D. Fudenberg,et al. Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information , 1985 .

[3] Larry Samuelson,et al. Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case , 1988, Oper. Res..

[4] Faruk Gul,et al. On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty , 1988 .

[5] Anat R. Admati,et al. Strategic Delay in Bargaining , 1987 .

[6] A. Rubinstein. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .

[7] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. Perfect sequential equilibrium , 1986 .

[8] A. McLennan. Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium , 1985 .

[9] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information , 1986 .

[10] David M. Kreps,et al. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria , 1987 .

[11] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A sequential theory of bargaining , 1985 .

[12] J. Sobel,et al. A Multistage Model of Bargaining , 1983 .

[13] Robert B. Wilson,et al. Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture , 1986 .

[14] In-Koo Cho. Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining , 1990 .

[15] In-Koo Cho,et al. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium , 1987 .

[16] A. Rubinstein. A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME PREFERENCES , 1985 .