Supplement to "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

A heat exchanger, for regulating the temperature of multiple integrated circuit modules, is fabricated by constructing a face on a hollow jacket such that the face consists essentially of a malleable metal with a coating of a release agent. In one embodiment, the malleable metal is fabricated as a foil which is attached to the jacket by an adhesive, and the coating is fabricated as a powder of the release agent which is rubbed into the surface of the foil.

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