论文信息 - Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade

Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade

Abstract Consider a bilateral-trade model with two-sided incomplete information. For a general set of independent beliefs, an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient, interim individually rational mechanism is constructed. Thus, imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency.

Thomas A. Gresik

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