Structural Estimation of Marriage Models

A structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom. A two‐sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents’ preferences is utilized. Estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure. Results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men; education is more desirable for black men. The marriage market for white men is more flexible. Both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents’ wage and education decrease with age for white men.

[1]  Gerard J. van den Berg,et al.  An empirical equilibrium job search model with search on the job and heterogeneous workers and firms , 1999 .

[2]  Melvyn G. Coles,et al.  Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment , 1999 .

[3]  Melvyn G. Coles,et al.  Marriage and Class , 1997 .

[4]  R. K. Young,et al.  Mate assortment in dating and married couples , 1996 .

[5]  T. Bergstrom,et al.  Income prospects and age-at-marriage , 1995, Journal of population economics.

[6]  E. J. Collins,et al.  The job search problem as an employer–candidate game , 1990, Journal of Applied Probability.

[7]  C. A. Pissarides,et al.  Equilibrium Unemployment Theory , 1990 .

[8]  G. Duncan,et al.  Assessing the Quality of Household Panel Data: The Case of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics , 1989 .

[9]  M. Montgomery,et al.  Female first marriage in East and Southeast Asia: a Kiefer-Neumann model. , 1989, Journal of development economics.

[10]  S. J. Spurr.  How the Market Solves an Assignment Problem: The Matching of Lawyers with Legal Claims , 1987, Journal of Labor Economics.

[11]  Gary Chamberlain,et al.  Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data: Heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, and duration dependence , 1985 .

[12]  J. Ondrich.  The Initial Conditions Problem in Work History Data , 1985 .

[13]  M. Rosenzweig,et al.  Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selection: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior , 1984, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  Walter Y. Oi,et al.  HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION , 1983 .

[15]  G. Becker.  Chapter Title: a Theory of Marriage a Theory of Marriage , 2022 .

[16]  J. Spuhler.  Assortative mating with respect to physical characteristics. , 1968, Eugenics quarterly.

[17]  N. Kiefer,et al.  Specification and Estimation of Equilibrium Search Models , 2001 .

[18]  Wing Suen,et al.  A Direct Test of the E?cient Marriage Market Hypothesis , 1999 .

[19]  John H. Pencavel.  Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands , 1998 .

[20]  T. Bergstrom,et al.  Income Prospects and Age-at-Marriage Journal of Population Economics , 1996 .

[21]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[22]  G. Neumann,et al.  Dynamic econometric modeling: Estimating structural models of unemployment and job duration , 1988 .

[23]  S. Rosen.  The Economics of Superstars , 1981 .

[24]  S. Vandenburg.  Assortative mating, or who marries whom? , 1972, Behavior genetics.