Boycotts, power politics, or trust building: How to prevent conflict?

In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyzes whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, . . . ) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the most effective instrument, then comes a weak boycott, followed by power politics. Finally, apart from requiring very detailed information on the relevant parameters of the economy, the use of confidence building measures has a serious flaw: it is incapable of averting civil war.

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