Intentions in Communication

It is fairly easy to imagine a situation in which this exchange makes perfect sense. The participants might, for instance, be playing badminton in a hall that is usually used by a boxing club after the end of the badminton session, and A wants to know whether there is time for another game before the boxing club arrive. It is also fairly easy to tell an informal story about how the conversational exchange above would serve this purpose. The usual story is that A thinks she would need to know what the time is in order to see whether she and her partner can go on playing. She doesn't know the time, but she knows that if she can persuade B to tell her then she will know it. She also knows that B won't be able to tell her unless she (B) knows it herself. If she demands to be told, and B in fact doesn't know what it is, then one or the other of them might be embarrassed. So A delicately asks whether B has this information, rather than asking for it outright. At this point B is supposed to recognize that A is unlikely to have any goals that could be directly furthered by finding out whether B knows the time. Since A has no goals that will be directly furthered by B's response to this question, and since people don't usually say things unless they expect some response that will help them get on in the world, B starts to wonder what A is up to. She realizes that the question that A actually produced was only a preliminary move, and that it was uttered in order to facilitate asking the follow-up:

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