Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers
暂无分享，去创建一个
[1] Inés Macho-Stadler,et al. Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..
[2] Francis Bloch,et al. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers , 2003 .
[3] Debraj Ray,et al. Coalitional Power and Public Goods , 2001 .
[4] P. Jean-Jacques Herings,et al. Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games , 1999, Int. J. Game Theory.
[5] Shlomo Weber,et al. On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games , 1999 .
[6] Debraj Ray,et al. A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures , 1998 .
[7] Debraj Ray,et al. Equilibrium Binding Agreements , 1997 .
[8] Sang-Seung Yi. Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities , 1997 .
[9] Francis Bloch. Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division , 1996 .
[10] Sang-Seung Yi. Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers , 1995 .
[11] Francis Bloch. Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies , 1995 .
[12] M. Chwe. Farsighted Coalitional Stability , 1994 .
[13] B. Bernheim. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .
[14] David Pearce. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .
[15] R. J. Aumann,et al. Cooperative games with coalition structures , 1974 .