The Three Ps: Increasing concurrent operation by unambiguously defining and delegating radio rights

The increasingly intensive coexistence of diverse radio systems and the inability of existing institutions to resolve conflicts in a timely manner requires a change in the way operating rights are defined, assigned and enforced. We propose that operating rights should be articulated using transmission permissions and reception protections, defined probabilistically (the Three Ps). Transmission permissions should be based on resulting field strength over space and frequency, rather than radiated power at a transmitter. Reception protections should state the maximum electromagnetic energy an operator can expect from other operations. This formulation does not require a definition of harmful interference, which is delegated to operators and adjudicators should the need for it arise, and does not entail receiver standards. We also recommend ways to facilitate the adjustment of rights in the market place. The remedy (injunction vs. damages) that attaches to an operating right should be stipulated when it is issued. The regulator should separate its rule making and adjudication roles by not changing rights during dispute resolution. The regulator should leave parameter values unchanged after defining an entitlement, though it may add new parameters at license renewal. Values may be adjusted by negotiation between operators at any time, though any changes should be recorded in a public registry of entitlements. The number of parties to a negotiation should be limited by minimizing the number of rights recipients and by enabling direct bargaining between the parties through effective delegation, obviating the regulator's participation.

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