Social Relations and Endogenous Culture

The current state of economics as a science is critically evaluated in view of its lack of emphasis on sociological and psychological factors. In particular, I argue that humans are embedded in social structures and that they choose actions taking account of the social contexts in which they live and the social interactions to which they belong. Preferences then should be considered not as exogenously given but as endogenously evolved, allowing for bounded rationality and psychological factors. I provide a brief sketch of the possible model formulation for a more desirable theory, invoking network theory and an indirect evolutionary approach.

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