Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

This study is the first proposing allocatively efficient multi‐attribute auctions for the procurement of multiple items. In the B2B e‐commerce logistics problem (ELP), the e‐commerce platform is the shipper generating a large number of online orders between product sellers and buyers, and third‐party logistics (3PL) providers are carriers that can deliver these online orders. This study focuses on the ELP with multiple attributes (ELP‐MA), which is generally the problem of matching the shipper's online orders and 3PL providers given that price and other attributes are jointly evaluated. We develop a one‐sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (O‐VCG) auction for the ELP‐MA. The O‐VCG auction leads to incentive compatibility (on the sell side), allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. We next introduce the concept of universally unsatisfied set to construct a primal‐dual algorithm, also called the primal‐dual Vickrey (PDV) auction. We prove that the O‐VCG auction can be viewed as a single‐attribute multi‐unit forward Vickrey (SA‐MFV) auction. Both PDV and SA‐MFV auctions realize VCG payments and truthful bidding for general valuations. This result reveals the underlying link not only between single‐attribute and multi‐attribute auctions, but between static and dynamic auctions in a multi‐attribute setting.

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